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the disadvantages of both and the advantages of neither.
They are an incomplete code that is neither flesh, fowl, nor
good red herring. They form a crooked splint that emasculates the flexibility of the law without even the compensating
advantage of holding it straight and secure.
No glib and easy way to Utopia, the adoption of the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure in
place of the existing statutes would not fully meet popular
criticism of criminal justice. It would, however, work a
great substantive improvement in bringing the law up to the
date of the society in which it exists, and achieve a desperately
needed transition in mechanics from confusion to clarity,
STANLEY L. DREXLER,
order, and practicability.
Class of 1936.

THE SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS IN COLORADO
HE common law on the survival of actions was best
expressed by the maxim "Actio personalis moritur cum
persona." By enactment of the territorial legislature,
January 10, 1868, that maxim, with the rest of the general
common law as of the fourth year of the reign of James I
(1607) became a part of the law of the territory which was
to be the State of Colorado. Another act of the same legislature, in the same year, set out the rule of survival of actions
which, with a slight modification, stands as law in Colorado
today. Under the schedule to the Constitution, both acts
became a part of the law of the State of Colorado. The statute declaring survival appears, as reenacted by Section 167
of the Session Laws of 1903, as Section 5383 of the Compiled Laws of 1921, reading: "All actions at law whatsoever, save and except actions on the case for slander or libel,
or trespass for injuries done to the person, and actions for the
recovery of real property, shall survive to and against executors, administrators, and conservators."
By the terms of this statute, the rule of the common law
is reversed. Instead of "Actio personalis moritur," we find
the law to be "All actions . . . shall survive," and only the
exceptions to the general statement of the Colorado statute
are in accord with the common law. Let us then proceed to
the interpretation of that statute.
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Probably the most fundamental point decided under that
statute is that it applies not only to "actions" in the technical
sense of an action already commenced, but to "causes of action," whether action has been brought or not. The contrary
apparently has never been suggested to the Colorado courts,
and the first case declaring the statute to apply to causes of
action, Kelley v. Union Pacific, 16 Colo. 455, laid down that
rule apparently without realizing that it was doing so. It is
said in that case (p. 458): "The act of 1868 was to prevent
certain causes of action already accrued from abating by reason of the death of either of the parties, without regard to the
cause of such death." The only intimation to the contrary is
contained in the case of Stratton'sIndependence v. Dines, 126
Fed. 968, where in the nature of a dictum it is said that the
statute applies only to "actions," and has no effect upon the
common law rule that a cause of action, upon which action
has not been brought, does not survive the death of either
party. In view of the statement contained in Kelley v. Union
Pacific, and the holdings in DeFord v. Ins. Co., 75 Colo.
146, Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167, and other cases,

it is clear that the Stratton case is in opposition to the proper
interpretation of the statute. It is clearly settled that the
terms of Section 5383 apply to causes of action, as well as
actions already commenced.
With the meaning of "actions" settled, we may proceed
to consider the meaning of the remainder of the statute. That
consideration will resolve itself into a consideration of the
exceptions contained in the statute, for the general declaration, "All actions shall survive," has been accepted at its face
value by the courts, and we shall consider the exceptions in
the order in which they occur.
"... except actions on the case for slander or libel." The
terms of the statute are so clear in this regard that neither of
the Colorado courts, the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, nor the Federal court, has ever been called upon to
consider them. Without argument, it seems to have been
admitted that slander and libel do not survive.
"... except ...

trespass for injuries done to the person."

Under this second exception, there are two questions which
arise. First, what is the meaning of the word "trespass"?
And second, what is the meaning of the phrase, "injuries
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done to the person"? Kelley v. Union Pacific, supra, presented the first of these questions to the court. In that case,
the court realized that the meaning of the word "trespass"
might be confined to actions which at the common law would
have been actions of trespass, or it might have a broader
meaning, and cover the type of action that would have been
trespass on the case, as well as simple trespass. The court
discussed, but did not decide, this problem, but based its decision on the ground that the action there was one in contract,
and not within the exception in any case.
Munal v. Brown, 70 Fed. 967, presented this same
question to Judge Hallett, sitting in the United States District Court, in such manner that it could not be avoided. He
declared that, "Trespass for injuries done to the person"
included an action for trespass on the case as well as an action
for trespass, and dismissed an action based upon the negligence of a decedent, brought against his estate. The Colorado Court of Appeals cited and followed Judge Hallett's
ruling on that point in Letson v. Brown, 11 Colo. App. 11,
a case arising from the identical explosion.
The first question, as to the meaning of "trespass," may
be
regarded
as settled by these two cases. The meaning of
"trespass," for
this purpose, includes both trespass and trespass on the case, and both die with the death of either party.
Our second question, as to the meaning of "injuries done
to the person," is of greater difficulty, and has caused a great
deal more trouble than has the first. The starting point is
again Kelley v. Union Pacific, supra, containing dictum that
depletion of an estate is an injury to the estate, and not an
injury to the person within the contemplation of the statute.
To that extent the dictum has been adopted, as will appear
later, but the conclusion upon which the dictum was basedthat depletion of an estate caused by injuries to the body and
mind of its owner is properly to be considered an injury to
the estate-is clearly unsupportable, and has never been
accepted.
The first real light upon this subject came from Mumford
v. Wright, 12 Colo. App. 214, a case concerned with the
assignability of a cause of action for wrongful attachment of
property. After stating that survivability of the cause was
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the best test of its assignability, the court considered the
Colorado survival statute and its application to the facts presented. It is there said, at page 217, "Torts may be divided
into two classes, the first, designated as property torts, embracing all injuries and damages to property, real and personal; the second, known as personal torts, including all
injuries to the person, whether to reputation, feelings, or to
the body." And later, at page 218, "In our opinion, the
legislature had in view upon the adoption of that statute the
common law distinction then prevailing between personal
and property torts and desired to permit actions on the latter
to survive, . . . whilst the old rule should still prevail as to
actions based upon the former character of torts."
Swartz v. Rosenkrans, supra, an action of trover, accepts
the theory of Mumford v. Wright, that property torts survive while personal torts do not, and also the definitions of
Mumford v. Wright as to what are personal and what property torts. It is there declared, in holding that the action survives: "This action is also in tort, arising out of a violation
of the property rights of the deceased, causing a loss or damage thereto, by means of which his estate was depleted."
DeFord v. Ins. Co., supra, follows the theory of Mumford v.
Wright in holding that property torts survive while personal
torts do not, though its holding on what constitutes a property tort is not entirely clear.
These three cases, and those of Selkregg v. Thomas, 27
Colo. App. 259; Portland Co. v. Stratton's Independence,
196 Fed. 716, and others, make it clear that tort actions,
based upon trespass or trespass on the case, in which the injury or damage is to the property, survive the death of either
party, while those same actions, in which the injury or damage is done to the person, die with either party.
This distinction between personal and property torts
clarifies the issue to a great extent, but by no means completely, for it must still be determined what are personal
torts, and what are property torts. Under the broad definitive statements of Mumford v. Wright, which seem to have
been generally accepted, this is in most cases obvious, but
there are at least two sorts of cases in which there is doubt as
to which of the two classes the injuries come under.
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Mumford v. Wright and Swartz u. Rosenkrans are both
concerned, to a certain extent, with the matter of exemplary
damages. The general tenor of Mumford v. Wright, although
it is nowhere expressly so stated, is that the grant of such
damages must be based upon the violation of a purely personal right, and an action whose gist is the grant of such
damages must therefore be a personal tort, and does not survive. Swartz u. Rosenkrans, on the other hand, declares (p.
169), "There is no reason why we should not here follow
the principles applicable to such class of damages in other
similar suits," and allowed exemplary damages in the action
by an administrator upon a tort committed against the decedent.
The cases are readily distinguishable in fact, of course, in
that Swartz v. Rosenkrans is an action for conversion, while
Mumford u. Wright is a special statutory action for wrongful attachment, but the reasoning of the two cases is clearly
opposed. Swartz v. Rosenkrans, coming from the higher
court, and at a later date, must of course take precedence, but
there is much to be said for the attitude taken by the Court
of Appeals in Mumford v. Wright. The matter of exemplary damages received but cursory consideration in Swartz
v. Rosenkrans.
In all probability, the survival of the right to exemplary
damages is determined by the survival of the action in which
the damages are granted, but the matter cannot be regarded as
conclusively settled, and it is the opinion of the writer that
the Supreme Court would be willing to listen to arguments
to the contrary.
The second class of cases in which the application of the
rule and definitions of Mumford v. Wright is not quite clear
is what is sometimes called "The Newer Forms of Tort Liability," involving injuries to rights of a rather anomalous
character, in that they are not in the accepted sense injuries to
either the person or the person's property. Such cases involve
no injury to the reputation, feelings, or body, nor do they
involve injuries to the property such as would be provable as
damages in torts of a more classic character.
In two such cases the Colorado Supreme Court has been
called upon to apply the survival statute. The first was
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DeFord v. Ins. Co., supra, an action based upon the negligent
failure of an insurance company to act upon an application
for insurance. Upon demurrer to an action brought by the
beneficiary named in the application, the court held that the
action, if sustainable, must have been considered as an action
for failure to discharge a duty owed to the deceased, and was
not an action upon a contract, and sustained the demurrer.
Therefore, the action was one in tort, and damages, if any,
were to be provable as tort damages. In overruling a demurrer to action brought by the administrator, the court held
that the action was one for trespass, within the meaning of
the statute, but that the injuries were not injuries to the person, and the action survived to the administrator.
On the other hand, there is the case of Clapp v. Williams,
90 Colo. 13, an action brought for wrongful expulsion from
a labor union. The death of plaintiff pending appeal made
it necessary for the court to consider whether the action survived. It was there held that the action was one to recover
"for the loss of good will, an asset peculiar to the plaintiff."
The court held such injuries to be personal, and that the action did not survive.
The above cases are the only ones in which the court has
applied the survival statute to these newer developments of
the law of torts. In both cases th damages fall midway
between damages to the person and damages to the property,
as explained in the earlier cases. It cannot be said that the
cases are in conflict, for they are not necessarily so. The better conclusion is that the law on such matters has not developed to an extent sufficient to warrant any general conclusions as to the type of injuries which are caused, and that the
court must, by the pin-pricking process of judicial determination, establish a line of demarcation somewhere in the gap
which the classifications and definitions of the earlier cases
have left.

Such seems to be the determination of the second exception to the general law of Section 5383. The exception includes actions of trespass on the case, as well as trespass, and
speaking generally, includes only injuries done to the reputation, feelings, or body, and not injuries done to the property.
It is probable that the survival of the right to exemplary
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damages depends upon the survival of the action upon which
the right is based, but this is not certain, and there are excellent arguments to the contrary. As to the newer developments in the field of tort liability, no general statements may
be made. Each action will survive or die upon its own facts,
for there is scant authority on the matter.
The interpretation thus placed on this exception leaves
some interesting anomalies in the law. If A negligently
drives his car into that of B, causing injuries to B's person,
clothes, and car, and A dies in the collision, B can recover the
damages to his car and clothing from A's estate, but may
have no recovery for the injuries to his person. Or, if A's
car is driven by a chauffeur, C, who dies in the accident, A
surviving, B may not recover from the estate of C for his personal injuries, but may recover from A, whose liability was
not, so to speak, direct, but was based solely upon agency
principles. But, at the same time, B may proceed against
either A or the estate of C for the injuries to the car and
clothing.
Lastly, we consider the third exception, "...
except .
actions brought for the recovery of real estate." The action
covered by this exception seems to be contained in Chapter
23, and the latter part of Chapter 22, of Courtright's Mills
Annotated Code, 1933. A consideration of such provisions of the code as relate to the survival and abatement of
that action is of course necessary to a proper determination of
the meaning of the exception.
Section 15, Courtright's Mills Annotated Code, 1933,
provides that an action which survives shall not abate because
of the death of either party during suit. Section 306 declares
that the action for the recovery of real property shall not
abate by the death of any or all parties, but may be continued
against their heirs, representatives, or successors (or for such
parties). Under the survival statute and Section 15 of the
code, the action would abate; under Section 306 of the code,
it specifically does not abate. There is an apparent conflict,
but considering the survival statute to be substantive, and
the code provisions to be procedural, we may reach a fair
rationalization. Upon the death of either party during the
pendency of suit, the action dies, under the statute, but the
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interest of the deceased party passes to his heirs, representatives, or successors in interest at the moment of the death, and
since this interest comes by inheritance, it is exactly the same
as that of the deceased. Therefore, in order to avoid the
expense and delay, both to the litigants and the court, which
would be occasioned by the bringing of a new action on the
identical facts and rights, the procedural law, expressed by
the code, provides that the old suit may be continued.
Viewed technically, this is not a continuation of the prior
suit, but is the substitution of a new one, exactly on the
footing of the old. The terms of the survival statute are not
expressly overcome, although it must be admitted that the
effect of this procedure is to overcome them in substance.
Section 293, Courtright's Mills Annotated Code, 1933,
provides that the termination of the right of a plaintiff pending action shall not abate the action, but that he may have
a verdict for damages. Considered in the light of the conclusion above, and assuming that the death of a plaintiff is a
termination of his right within the meaning of the section,
the conclusion is that this action is of a dual character, part
for the recovery of the realty, part for damages for its detention. Section 293, allowing a recovery for damages only,
would so imply. This section, and those previously considered, seem to indicate, in a case of death of plaintiff with suit
pending, that his estate may recover damages for the withholding of possession, while the successor to his interest in
the property may recover the possession. Likewise, in case of
the death of a defendant, the person or persons entitled to
recover as above may recover against the estate for the withholding of possession, and against the successor to the deceased's interest may recover the possession itself.
These are admittedly the bare conclusions of the writer,
for neither Section 293 nor 306 has been considered in connection with the survival statute, so far as we are able to
ascertain. We hazard no opinion as to whether such reasoning would stand before the questioning eye of the court.
Such seems to be the meaning of Section 5383 of the
1921 laws---clear in most cases, uncertain and confused on a
few points, and completely open on others.
RICHARD P. BROWN,
Class of 1935.
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To MEMBERS OF THE DENVER BAR:

The Denver Bar Association is conducting a campaign
to take vigorous action to suppress the unlawful practice of
law in the City of Denver.
At the present moment in Denver many laymen are unlawfully preparing deeds, wills and legal papers of all kinds
and giving legal advice. Laymen are prosecuting actions and
appearing for corporations, individuals and agencies in the
justice courts and other courts. These and many other practices must be stopped.
The success of this campaign must depend to a very
large extent upon the interest and cooperation of each member of the Bar. It is to your interest to see that the practice
of law in Denver is carried on only by duly licensed and
authorized lawyers. The committee on unlawful practice of
the law is making every effort to ferret out the various unlawful practices. However, although it can do much in that
regard, it can do infinitely more if each member of the Bar
will immediately communicate to the committee any information he may obtain concerning the unauthorized practice
of law by any individual, agent, copartnership or corporation.
If any such practices are brought to your attention, will
you kindly communicate such information at once to the
undersigned?
Very truly yours,
MILTON D. GREEN,

Chairman, Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law.

